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BANK ASSETS AS CIRCULATION SECURITY. There was a time when the Maverick bank, of Boston, was looked upon as a great concern, and when, a few years ago, it failed, much surprise was expressed. By order of the United States district court, the bank's assets have just been sold. Their face value was $1,095,890; they brought $429. A few days ago a couple of large banks in Philadelphia failed, and failed because of a depreciation of assets, and not as the result of bad or reckless banking methods. It is very doubtful if the assets of the Philadelphia banks will be enough to save depositors harmless; if they do more than that, it will be an exception to the rule of banks that fail. Supposing that when these banks failed the Gage currency plan had been in operation, their circulation, permitted to the amount of 25 per cent of their assets, and based upon them (this, of course, in addition to their circulation secured by bonds), would fall as a debt on the government, its security being the 2 per cent tax per annum on the unsecured circulation, and by a first lien upon all assets. If the fund arising from this tax were not sufficient to make the government whole, the assets being wined out of existence, the difference between the amount of unsecured circulation of the failed banks and the unsecured circulation fund would fall as a dead loss on the governn it. When a bank is solvent, its assets are valuable, because they must be to make it solvent; and when it is not solvent, it is because, as a general rule, its assets are not valuable. Now, bank assets are very largely a matter of figures, and they can be run up high or down low, at the pleasure of those in control of the bank. Under the Gage plan, all notes issued by banks would be perfectly secure, for the government guarantee would be behind them. But what of the government? Its real security, practically its only security, is the 2 per cent tax on the unsecured circulation; the assets' security, save in rare cases, would be of little or no value. There is not any likelihood that the Gage plan will meet with favor at the hands of congress, but the failure of the two big Philadelphia banks cannot fail to draw special attention to the assets' security provision, and show its real weakness. Under it the strong banks, through the security tax, must carry the weak ones, and to them the government would have to look for its own indemnification.