National Bank of Commerce (New York, NY)

View Charter #733 on SPMC View balance sheet

Episode Information

Episode UID
73301294
Episode Type
Run → Suspension → Reopening
Bank Type
national
Bank ID
7330 national
Charter Number
733
Start Date
October 24, 1907
Location
New York, New York

Metadata

Model
gpt-5-mini (chosen from majority vote of a three-model LLM ensemble)
Short Digest
de59c4c745768e42

Response Measures

Accommodated withdrawals, Borrowed from banks or large institutions, Clearinghouse loan, Fed/other loan, Partial suspension, Full suspension

Clearinghouse involved: Yes (loan, examination, or other measures)

Description

Sources name the bank and discuss the 1907 New York banking suspension, but direct evidence that this specific bank formally suspended is mixed; additional local articles would help.

Events (5)
1. January 19, 1865 Chartered
Source
historical_nic
2. October 24, 1907 Suspension
Cause
Macro News
Cause Details
Collective suspension of cash payments by New York banks during the 1907 panic (clearinghouse certificates, restricted cash payments).
Newspaper Excerpt
It appears that the financial difficulties of the West were wholly due to the suspension of payment by the New York banks
Source
newspapers
3. October 26, 1907 Run
Cause
Macro News
Cause Details
General nationwide panic of October 1907 produced runs on New York banks and heavy withdrawals
Measures
Banks invoked 30- to 90-day notice (refused immediate payment); paid large depositors in checks
Newspaper Excerpt
All of the savings banks in New York today refused to pay depositors on demand...At those banks which had experienced runs the lines disappeared
Source
newspapers
4. December 3, 1907 Reopening
Newspaper Excerpt
The New York banks have been announcing for some time that specie payments are about to be resumed. ... As long as the banks of that city continue to withhold payment...the stoppage of such payments by the banks in New York [was causing trouble].
Source
newspapers
5. April 5, 1929 Voluntary Liquidation
Source
historical_nic

Newspaper Articles (15)
1. October 26, 1907 The Washington Times Washington, DC
Article from The Washington Times, October 26, 1907

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Many Send in Written Desires to Withdraw Deposits. Cortelyou Given Credit for Terminating the Money Flurry. NEW YORK, Oct. 26.-All of the savings banks in New York today refused to pay depositors on demand. Under an agreement reached at a meeting of their presidents yesterday, the banks took advantage of the clause in their by-laws which permits them to demand from thirty to ninety days' notice from depositors who wish to draw on their accounts. Notices were posted on all savings banks to this effect today, from the biggest, with deposits of almost $100,000,000, to the smallest, with deposits of only $17,000. The result was felt immediately. At those banks which had experienced runs the lines disappeared, although many filed written notices of their intention to withdraw their deposits at the expiration of the thirty, sixty, or ninety days, according to whichever period the bank adopted.

2. October 30, 1907 The Madison Daily Leader Madison, SD
Article from The Madison Daily Leader, October 30, 1907

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SCARE IS SUBSIDING Runs Upon New York Banks Practically Cease. STOCK MARKET UNSTEADY Calling in of Loans Causes a Decline in Prices, Canadian Pacific Leading in the Slump-Worldwide Scramble for Gold. New York, Oct. 30.-The financial situation is without notable developments. and the abating interest indicates that the public has pretty well gotten over its scare. The stock markets is a little unsteady, but without extreme agitation. The announcement at the ImpeS rial bank of Germany a raised its discount rate from 5 1/2 to 6 1/2 per cent in order to protect its gold holdings was not unexpected by bankers here. It is thought quite likely that the Bank of England will follow suit by raising its rate at the regular meeting on Thursday. The scramble for gold is such at all the financial centersLondon, Paris, Berlin and New York -that the metel will go to the highest bidder and under present conditions New York is likely to appear for a time in this role. Her ability to get gold is due not only to the need for it, but to the large credits which are being established by the movement of the crops and other products-notably wheat, cotton, copper, tobacco and meats-and by the sale of American securities. These influences are usually more potent than artificial measures to obtain the yellow metal. It is believed this will be effective to place sufficient gold at the command of the New York market and to maintain credit and cause the resumption of banking operations in the usual manner within a few days. Runs upon the banks here have practically ceased since the banks adopted the policy of paying large depositors in checks. Some transfers of accounts are being made from the smaller to the larger banks, which resulted in adverse balances against the former, but strengthening the ability of the larger institutions to meet pressure and to support the market.

3. December 3, 1907 The Roswell Daily Record Roswell, NM
Article from The Roswell Daily Record, December 3, 1907

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"The current number of Harper's Weekly contains an editorial 'roast' of the clearing house certificates issued in Las Vegas, New Mexico. In view of the fact that the financial difficulties of the West were wholly due to the suspension of payment by the New York banks, and the issue by these banks of clearing house certificates and other forms of 'Johnsmith' currency—as it is now called—it would seem that the Weekly might have found a target for its ammunition nearer home.—Socorro Chieftain.

4. December 3, 1907 Deseret Evening News Salt Lake City, UT
Article from Deseret Evening News, December 3, 1907

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# RESUMPTION. Horace Greely was wont to say that "the way to resume is to resume." The New York banks have been announcing for some time that specie payments are about to be resumed. It appears that the bankers elsewhere are ready to pay cash as soon as New York decides to keep its promises. It is noted as one peculiar feature of the present panic that some of the New York bankers will become rich because of it. And we doubt not that the most immediate cause of the suspension of cash payment by the banks all over the country was the stoppage of such payments by the banks in New York. As long as the banks of that city continue to withhold payment of their obligations, there seems to be no reason why they might not be purchasing the government bonds and so making a profit out of withholding cash payments to the rest of the country. Such a suggestion is made in many quarters, and the way to negative any such suspicion is for the New York banks to pay their obligations inland in the current money of the realm.

5. December 5, 1907 The Daily Sentinel Grand Junction, CO
Article from The Daily Sentinel, December 5, 1907

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It is rumored that for several weeks it has been known that the National Bank of Commerce was liable to suspend business. Financial correspondence with that market center, on the part of outside banks having Kansas City paper to collect on, and various other circumstances have indicated that the National Bank of Commerce was having more or less trouble. It is said that the now closed bank had for a long period paid three per cent interest on average daily cash balances, a higher rate of interest, It is said, than paid by any other big general banking institutions on such business, in the country. New York City banks pay from 2 per cent to 2 1/2 per cent, very few paying the latter. Owing to the high rate of interest this bank has been paying in many quarters it has been predicted for a long period that sooner or later the bank would come to grief. Paying such a rate of interest the bank, it seems, could not make legitimate profits, and hence the failure. It is not probable that the failure will affect western banks to any material extent. The banks that will suffer will be those of the Southwest, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Kansas, and of Kansas City, who depended largely on this bank for its money.

6. December 27, 1907 Albuquerque Morning Journal Albuquerque, NM
Article from Albuquerque Morning Journal, December 27, 1907

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BANK DEPOSITORS RECOVER FROM PANIC (New York. Dec. 26.-Today was the date of the expiration of most of the sixty-day withdrawal notices re. quired by the savings banks at the height of the paniè in October, but searcely a depositor called for his money

7. February 7, 1908 The Times Dispatch Richmond, VA
Article from The Times Dispatch, February 7, 1908

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City were increased on the security of stock and bond loans from $281,000,000 to $302,000,000. Three hundred and twelve millions loaned on collateral of Wall Street, and yet they suspended payments to their individual depositors and to their banking correspondents throughout the country. And they did it when they had money in their treasury with which to meet their obliga-tions." ### Kept Cash; Got Premium. Mr. Culberson declared that while New York had so much cash in its banks Southern banks were paying a premium for cash. The Aldrich bill, he declared, would give the banks more power and would foster stock and bond speculation by the banks and still further discriminate against the general public, and in the interest of the bondholding classes. "Against this policy," he added, "I want to enter my earnest and emphatic protest." Senator Hopkins replied briefly to Mr. Culberson. "Every statement made by the Senator," he said, "has been answered by the Secretary of the Treasury in his report." Mr. Culberson said the secretary refused to give the Texas banks deposits they asked for, and Mr. Hopkins replied that he had done the same thing in respect to Chicago banks, as he put the money where he believed the greatest emergency existed. The consideration of Mr. Culberson's resolution was postponed, and it was allowed to lie on the table.

8. March 12, 1908 The Birmingham Age-Herald Birmingham, AL
Article from The Birmingham Age-Herald, March 12, 1908

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FINANCIAL BILL HOTLY DENOUNCED Senator Clarke of Arkansas Hits Several Fierce Blows ALDRICH ATTEMPTS REPLY Investigation of Causes of the Panic Is Demanded by Senator Clarke, Who Also Denounces New York Stock Exchange. Washington, March 11.-Senator Clarke of Arkansas denounced the pending currency bill in a speech in the Senate today, declaring that no currency legislation should be enacted until an investigation is held as to the causes of the panic. "No such legislation is necessary now, said Mr. Clarke. "It is not only not necesI sary, but it may become dangerous. am not disposed to tolerate the idea of giving any support to the committee bill, nor the substitute proposed by the minority members of the Senate." If emergency currency is to be provided, Mr. Clarke said, the benefits should be extended all persons whose legitimate business demands cause them to need it. Mr. Clarke denounced the operations of stock exchanges and said the American people would not be satisfied with the proposed currency legislation without a complete knowledge of causes of the panic. "The time has arrived," he said, "when the affairs of the New .York stock exchange and other stock exchanges must be looked into." Mr. Clarke's reference to the stoppage of the payments by the New York banks called Mr. Aldrich to his feet with the remark that he did not believe the people would permit that course again to be pursued. "I trust the senator from Rhode Island as a historian," retorted Mr. Clarke, "but I do not trust him as a prophet." Mr. Clarke expressed the opinion that the majority would not pass the bill allowing the emergency circulation to be retired without limitation. Mr. Clarke said he would not only require a restriction of reserves, but he would deny to a national bank the right to pay interest on checking accounts. Senator Nelson suggested that the national banks should pay interest on the $250,000,000 of government deposits. Mr. Aldrich said that five years ago he had introduced a bill providing for the payment of interest on such deposits at the rate of 1 1/2 per cent, but, he added, senators had opposed that bill on the ground that it changed the nature of the loan. Former Senator Spooner and the late Senator Morgan, he said, opposed the bill. If that objection could be overcome he declared his willingness to again bring in such a measure. He did not know any reason unless it should be a legal one, of the kind suggested, why interest should not be charged on these deposits. Mr. Culberson, he said, had introduced a bill to require payment of interest on government deposits and it was now before the committee on finance. Mr. Bailey spoke at some length suggesting that the main purpose of his substitute was to favor the principle of government money instead of bank money He explained that he had provided for a distribution of the emergency currency in accordance with population, although he realized that business necessity was a greater measure of the amount they should have. But it was not possible to make sure of the business needs of the several sections and it was a simple matter to ascertain the population. An extended argument was made by Mr. Newlands of Nevada in favor of his view that the sending of a check from one state to another makes the business of banking interstate commerce.

9. September 9, 1909 New-York Tribune New York, NY
Article from New-York Tribune, September 9, 1909

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FAVORS CENTRAL BANK Mr. Vreeland's Remedy for Defects in Currency System. Bedford Springs, Penn., Sept. -The feature of to-day's session of the State Bankers' Association of Pennsylvania Convention was an address by Representative Edward B. Vreeland, of New York, chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee of the House. He said, in part: Panics are merely the culmination of long continued disease. The defects in our system are such that a period of great prosperity and expansion almost certainly results in panic. So much so that many of our people accept a panic as inevitable once every ten or fifteen years. But we have the example of the other great commercial countries to show that periods of prosperity and expansion do not necessarily result in money panies. They may be avoided by better banking and currency methods. The greatest defect in our currency system is its lack of response to. the needs of business. We need this element of elasticity in our volume of money more than any other great nation. There are those who think that the trouble during the panic of 1907 and preceding panics might have been averted if the banks were compelied to keep their cash reserves in their own vaults. This would be true to the extent that the bankers of the country would not then become frightened, and all attempt at the time to withdraw their balances from New York in cash. This is what forced the suspension of cash payment by the New York banks in 1907. But the thought of those who advocate this change is that banks with the full cash reserve in their vaults would be fortifled against panic. This is not to any considerable extent true. We need greater further centralization rather than a further scattering of reserves. We need rather a centralization of reserves so that a bank. If solvent, with good assets. could obtain all the money needed to pay off its depositors. Of course, centralization of reserves would only be possible if the banks knew that, beyond question, their money could be obtained, if needed, as the banks of England, France and Germany know that their reserves. and any amount needed in addition, can be obtained of the central bank. I am opposed to the branch bank system. The branch bank system will drive any other system with which it competes out of existence. The establishment of the branch bank system in the United States would, in time, mean the extermination of the small independent bank. It seems to me that one hundred years of experience covering a very wide field point irresistibly toward the centralization of banknote issue and of bank reserve. It seems to me that if we have safety and stability and still have flexibility in our system, it must be in the hands of some form of central authority and with some measure of government control. I would have a distinctively American institution. I would have an institution which would round out and complete our banking system, which would be the keynote of the arch and not one which would enter the field as the rival and competitor of the banks which we have. I would have its dividends limited to a small amount, `say 4 per cent, and the remainder of its earnings go into the national Treasury for the security of its note circulation, the paying off of the greenbacks or similar purposes for the general good. The result would be that its management would direct its policy in relation to note circulation, reserves and rates of interest, for the general welfare and not with the hope of making increased profits for the bank.

10. October 19, 1909 Rock Island Argus Rock Island, IL
Article from Rock Island Argus, October 19, 1909

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CENTRAL BANK EXPERIMENT ONCE WRECKED THE NATION'S CREDIT 100 New York firms went to the wall distant place to earn dividends for the BY TAV. stockholders. in one month. Every bank in the city (Special Correspondence of The Argus.) suspended. Congress was forced to The year 1791 marked the first bank Washington, Oct. 16.-That the of the United States. In that year pass an act forbidding the PennsylvaUnited States has had two unsuccessnia bank of the United States from congress chartered a bank for 20 years. ful experiences at running banks, and Its methods brought about, 18 years using the notes of the United States should therefore act slowly in considbank. Then the New York banks relater, the first bank panic in this counering Wall street's central government try. Bribery and corruption in politisumed business. But the reckless opcal affairs were the dominant features erations of the financiers who owned bank idea, will be urged by the small bankers of the country, who are anof the government's first experience in the United States bank brought on distagonistic to the program Senator Aldbanking. aster. Oct. 19, 1839, it failed, carrying In 1817 a second United States bank to ruin 343 of the 850 banks in the rich has promised to promote in a came into existence. Within a short series of speeches in the west upon union and causing 62 to suspend for a time it had 18 branches. In Novemhis return from Europe. time. Its debt to the Bank of England Attention will also be directed to the ber, 1818, it was insolvent. Forty conalone was $23,000,000, and the failure, fact that the greatest obstacle in Cangressmen who held stock in the insticoupled with the consequent repudiaada's struggle to develop has been her tion of indebtedness by several states, tution, however, enabled it to continue antiquated system of big central banks in business. For the following five destroyed American credit abroad. with branches in every country town, years there was keen financial disIn spite of the assurance given in inthrough which all surplus deposits are tress throughout the country. spired articles sent out from Washcentralized in the large cities. Vetoed Renewal of Charter. ington, that politics will play no part Pinches Small Banker. In 1823 President Jackson vetoed a in a central government bank, the The Canadian merchant or manufacrenewal of the bank's charter, the small bankers are apprehensive lest turer in the outlying town has been the contrary prevail. They can hardly bank retaliating with coercive measunable to secure bank accommodations ures. It contracted the money market conceive that it would be in keeping needed in his business, while idle and caused great distress. Other banks with the game of politics for any parmoney from his own town, which a losprang up. The United States bank ty to set up an institution such as a cally owned bank would gladly have continued operations under a charter government bank without manning it loaned him, has been sent to the head obtained by bribery from the state of with politicians, as only by taking adoffices of the big city bank with a local Pennsylvania, reissuing all its old vantage of such opportunities are great branch, perhaps to be invested in a far notes. The crash came in 1837, when political machines built up.

11. November 29, 1909 The Roswell Daily Record Roswell, NM
Article from The Roswell Daily Record, November 29, 1909

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U. S. BANK A FAILURE Washington, Nov. 29.-That the United States has had two unsuccessful experiences at running banks, and should, therefore, act slowly in considering Wall Street's central government bank idea, is being urged by the small bankers of the country, who are avowedly antagonistic to the program of Senator Aldrich. The country bankers are directing attention to the fact that the greatest obstacle in Canada's struggle to develop has been her antiquated systerm of big central banks with branches in every country town, through which all surplus deposits are centralized in the large citires. The Canadian merchant or manufacturer in the outlying town has been unable to secure bank accomodations needed in his business, while idle money from his own town, which a locally owned bank would gladly have loaned him, has been sent to the head offices of the big city bank with a local branch, perhaps to be invested in a far distant place to earn dividends for the stockholders. The year 1791 marked the first bank of the United States. In that year Congress chartered a bank for 20 years. Its methods brought about, 18 years later, the first bank panic in this country. Bribery and corruption in political affairs were the domi nant features of the government's first experience in banking. In 1817 a second United States bank came into existence. Within a short time it had 18 branches. In No. vember, 1818, it was insolvent. Forty Congressmen who held stock in the institution, however, enabled it to continue business. For the following five years there was keen financial distress throughout the country. In 1832 President Jackson vetoed a renewal of the bank's charter, the bank retaliating with coercive measures. I: contracted the money markets and caused great distress. Other banks sprung up. The United States bank continued operations under a charter obtained by bribery from the state of Pennsylvania, reissuing all of its old notes. The crash came in 1837, when 100 New York firms went to the wall in one month. Every bank in the city suspended. Congress was forced to pass an act forbidding the Pennsylvania Bank of the United States from using the notes of the old United States bank. Then the New York banks resumed business. But the reckless operations of the financiers who owned the United States bank brought on disaster. Oct. 19, 1839. it failed, carrying to ruin 343 of the 850 banks in the Union and causing sixty-two to suspend for a time. Its debt to the bank of England alone was $23,000,000, and the failure, coupled with the consequent ren pudiation of indebtedness by several states, destroyed American credit abroad. In spite of the assurance given by Senator Aldrich in his speeches in the west, that politics will play no 1 part in a central government bank, the small bankers are apprehensive [ lest the contrary prevail. They can hardly conceive that it would be in I keeping with the game of politics for any party to set up an institution such as a great government bank without manning it with politicians, as only by taking advantage of such opportunities are great political machines built up. :

12. November 16, 1911 Tulsa Daily World Tulsa, OK
Article from Tulsa Daily World, November 16, 1911

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# NECESSITY FOR CURRENCY REFORM. The National Citizens' league for the promotion of a sound banking system in the United States is receiving support and encouragement from every section in the country. It is purely a non-partisan organization and is approaching the subject of currency legislation from a business and not a political point of view. The indications are constantly growing brighter for the successful solution of this problem of national finances upon a basis that will make panics and consequent disasters a thing of the past. In discussing this subject the Saturday Evening Post relates the circumstances which Germany was recently called upon to face and asks the pertinent question, "What would have happenned here?" Upon this point the Post says: "They might have had a panic in Berlin this fall. There had been speculation and overtrading. Credit was under a severe strain. Some eighty million dollars of treasury notes were maturing. The war-clouded political horizon caused France to draw in her money, and the amount of Parsian funds lying at call in Berlin was estimated at 200 million dollars. In some parts of the empire signs of uneasiness among bank depositors appeared. The failure of the Bank of Egypt did not help matters. "The gravity of the situation appears from the fact that in a single week the Imperial Bank lost thirty-nine million dollars of its cash reserve. This is a rather larger loss of cash reserve than the New York associated banks suffered in October, 1907, when they resorted to clearing house loan certificates and restricted cash payments-leading to a wholesale dislocation of the country's banking system. There was no restriction of cash payments at Berlin, however. On the contrary, in six business days the Imperial bank increased its loans and discounts by 145 million dollars, and in order to do so increased its note issue by 154 million dollars. "Thus, notwithstanding the severe strain and the large loss of cash. October settlements were met without a hitch and Berlin paid back to Paris a 150 million dollars of call loans. Ten days later the discount rate at Berlin had fallen to 4 per cent. "All of which shows how a great central bank can deal with a crisis. What would have happened here under like conditions? Perhaps another suspension of cash payments; another breakdown of the banking system; another six or eight months of business doldrums-because we haven't the apparatus to meet a crisis. We know we are rather more liable to fiscal conflagrations than any other great nation; but we rely upon nothing but a volunteer bucket brigade to put them out."

13. June 14, 1912 The Detroit Times Detroit, MI
Article from The Detroit Times, June 14, 1912

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GOVERNMENT'S MONEY STOPPED PANIC IN 1907 George B. Cortelyou Tells How $25,000,000 Was Loaned To J. P. Morgan NEW YORK, June 13.-Testifying today before the Pujo congressional committee. which is investigating the money trust, George B. Cortelyou, who was secretary of the treasury at the time of the 1907 panic, told how the government loaned J. Pierpont Morgan the $25,000,000 which Morgan in turn loaned to banks and thus broke the panic on Oct. 24, 1907, sending call money down from 125 to 6 per cent. It was the first time that the details of how the treasury came to the rescue of the stock exchange was ever told by an authority as high as the ex-treasurer, and the brokers and spectators who packed the room listened with breathless interest as the real inside story was unfolded. Cortelyou said that he came to New York on Oct. 22, 1907, to investigate conditions, that night held a conference at the Hotel Manhattan with Morgan, Perkins, Vanderlip, Cannon, Hepburn, Stillman and other bankers. He denied that he had told them of his coming, but explained that Hamilton Fish, then sub-treasurer in New York, knew of Cortelyou's intended visit and informed him that the Morgan party would like to confer with him. At that time he obtained from each financier, he said, his views on the situation, but did not make any specific promise of aid from the government. There was no formal conference the next day, Cortelyou asserted, but he believed he talked to Morgan and Perkins again that night. As the result of these conferences, Cortelyou said he decided to advise the government to give relief and recommended that $25,000,000 be loaned for the purpose. The money was deposited with several New York banks the next day: Cortelyou said that Morgan represented no particular bank in the panic conferences, but was the "leading spirit among the business men seeking to relieve the situation. The witness admitted that he knew the $25,000,000 was loaned to New York banks under the direct supervision of Morgan. Asked what banks got the money, Cortelyou said he did not know but thought they were "such banks as the National Bank of Commerce, Hanover National, National City and First National. Job Printing Done Right. Times Printing Co., 15 John R.-st.

14. December 9, 1913 New-York Tribune New York, NY
Article from New-York Tribune, December 9, 1913

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# Senator Weeks Enters Lists. Senator O'Gorman said that the New York banks had lent to the country banks more than $410,000,000. Mr. Swanson insisted that the condition was exactly the reverse. Senator Weeks then called attention to the law which required that the New York banks keep 25 per cent of their reserves in their vaults, asserting that they had fallen below this limit when they suspended payments. Senator Root then took a hand in the discussion and elicited from Senator Swanson the admission that the country banks deposited their money with New York reserve agents with the understanding that it was to be loaned on call. "They knew," he said, "when the money was loaned that if there came a sudden demand from all parts of the country they would be subject to the difficulties and embarrassments arising from a defective system." For this reason, Senator Root intimated, there was no occasion whatever to blame the New York bankers for lending the money as they did. Senator O'Gorman quoted from the testimony given by country bankers before the Banking and Currency Committee to show that they had received more aid

15. August 7, 1914 Evening Star Washington, DC
Article from Evening Star, August 7, 1914

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be prevented, or, at least, its effects minimized can by the proper organization sysand control of a country's banking tem. No such premium upon money or taken such collapse of credit has of in of the leading that the last 100 years as Noplace general Europe during any States countries in in the United in December of 1907, war and social witnessed vember periods and of condition revolution. except of similar disastrous for a and credits in England one must Namoney back to the time of the wars of go while in Germany no such foun- ocpoleon, has taken place since the shown currence of the empire. France has the dation such a banking condition but once that in was several generations, and last defeat at the hands of Prussia, war after her payment of her billion-dollar troubles. indemity the and bitter internal There have been suspensions of banks and great failures of business and banking houses in Failures Abroad Not these countries just the same as as Heavy as Here. in the United States, yet these disasters have not (as so offen has been the case here) been alIowed to paralyze the credit of the country. In Great Britain, the powerful firm of Overend Gurney failed in 1866, the Bank of Glasgow in 1878 and the house of Baring Bros. in 1890. Yet, on each occasion, the trouble was confined and no national financial convulsion followed. In France the same ability to avert financial panic was shown upon the failof such great banking institutions as ure the Union Generale in 1882 and the Comptoir d' Escompte in 1899; while in Germany the failure of the famous Leipziger Bank in 1901 is another example. in the United States, the suspension of Yet, payments by the New York banks has been followed by distress from Maine to California. Although banking reform had been demanded for a number of years, it took the panic of 1907 to insure a thorough prosecution of the task. Minor changes in our banking laws had been made from time to time, but the great prosperity of the country caused Congress to shrink from the responsibility of undertaking extensive reconstruction of the laws to under any which business had attained such mighty proportions. * * In 1000 Congress pased a currency act for the better support of the greenbacks, the Treasury notes of 1890 Better Support of and the silver Greenbacks by Law. dollars. After the panic of 1007 the Aldrich-Vreeland act was promulgated, which provided that the national banks might organize themselves into national currency assoclations, and that a member bank, with outstanding note circulation secured by States bonds equal to 40 per cent of might extend its United its capital, note issues upon other classes of securities until the total was equal to the sum of its capital and surplus. This act was intended only to be an emergency measure, and was enacted to expire by limitation June 30, 1914. The provision for increasing their note issue up to the present has not been taken advantage of by the banks The act has been extended to June 30. 1915. Further, following the panic, the national monetary commission was established, for the purpose of investigating means for improving credit arrangements in this country. Members of this commission visited England, France and Germany, and made thorough studies of the banking systems in vogue in these coun- of tries. The banking arrangements Canada, Scotland, Belgium, Sweden. Switzerland, Italy, Russia, Mexico and Japan were also investigated. The findings of the commission were published in reforty volumes, which form a good view of the world's banking business. Out of these studies grew proposals for the establishment of a National Reserve Association, a representative association the banks, the units of which were of to all be the clearing house associations which the banks of each city now mainThe democratic Congress rejected this tain. plan in favor of the federal reserve whose provisions, wisely enforced. act, will probably be found better suited to needs of the country than would have been the any one among the numberless plans which have been proposed.