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to leave it. the conveyance, and, if he re leave not obliged to carry a person as 8 pas. as his general deportment is conand he may tender his fare), if the design of the person is to interfere with and prejuinterests. It has been said by one of the most disan innkeeper is not bound to entertain rival house, whose business there is to the be some limitation to the general right of the There mouthe general obligation of the carrier. The carrier is reason of the general obliger, to receive every by 80 doing be may seriously damage his business. the purpose of determing the reasonableness of the in question the probable effect upon the capital, busi1 interes's of admitting blacks into their cars indiscrimiwith the whites, is a matter for your consideration. Question always is whether in the particular instance the of the passenger is reasonable and proper; and if the was by virtue of & rule or regulation, then whether or regulation is reasonable and proper. That will be rule question for you to pass upon: Were the rules and reg. question reasonable and proper under all the circumThe Company had a right to prescribe them if they remeonable, and no passenger has a right to violate them. and shall be of opinion that they were reasonable and pronot their being made known to plaintiff, be was bound to submitted to them. It was his duty to have left the car requested 60 to do, or to have taken his stand on the platform, the choice between the two having been given On bis refusal to do so, it was lawful for the conductor him, using only such force as might be necessary for in If by reason of his resistance injury occurs to purpose. Company are not responsible. If the regulation was a one, and was made known to the plain. evidence leaves no doubt), the plaintiff bound to have submitted, and any injury he may have rein resisting, forms no ground for a claim for damage, force used in removing was not more than necessary. was not a reasonable and proper regulation, then the was not bound to submit to it, but was entitled to his the ejection wa. un\awful, and the defendauts are liadamages. In determining the question of the reasonaof this regulation, you must take all the circumstances in the care into consideration, and the probable inveloped upon the business and interests of the Company from blacks an equality as påssengers with whites. I shall emberrass you with any comments on this question so far control over it extends. It is one of those which call special exercise of gr+ wisdom, candor and fairness on of a Jury, and one in respect to which any admixture prejudice or passion in determining the question may tend to impair, on one side or the other, the rights of these This, however, you will bear in mind, viz: the quesmisnot whether the Company furnish accommodation suffiall the colored people who may apply, for there is no as I have already said, that the plaintiff was obliged this car because he could not get accommodation in enter those set apart to their special use, but the question is whether the rule by which the plaintiff was, as a colored excluded from this car was, under all the circumstances, resorable and proper. It is contended by the plaintiff that, as law. the Company have no right to exclude one of persons, as a class, from their cars: and if this then it is clear there is no further ques20, is this case, and the question of reasonableness the rule does not arise. On that point it is my duty instruct you. Whichever way I may rule on this question, tis one which will probably be hereafter discussed before a tribural, but for the purposes of this trial I shall rule in your opinion such a rule and regulation is, under the investances developed in this case, a reasonable and proper fact then the Company had the right, in law, to make it. shall find that this was a reasonable and proper regulayou then, as the plaintiff was bound to have submitted to it, he did not, the defendants will be entitled to your verunless, in expelling the plaintiff from the car, the agexts det Company used unnecessary violence. And, on this question of the degree of force proper to use, it is proper that I say to you again, that if the regulation was proper, the sizistiff was not justified in resisting the effort to expel him, ad the Company are not responsible for the consequences of exertions of the increased force rendered necessary by such sistence. this proper further to say that the plaintiff can have no claim indumages for any violence which may have been used to prehis reëntering the car after be was actually put outside and it. His legal rights do not depend on any such attempt and adress himself. If he had peaceably left the car when deted by the conductor to leave it, his legal right to this action maldhave been as perfect as it now is after all his resistance. shall find tbat this was not a reasonable and propor reguthen the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict at your hands, GOD, the only question will be as to damages. In law, expulwould be an unjustifiable trespass and assault on the perthe plaintiff, and for which you have a right to give such dazonges as you may deem reasonable, having reference to the store and publicity of the assault, and the injury to the plainfeelings, reputation and person. But it is proper to remind of what the plaintiff's counsel himself admits, that the obthis action is not 80 much damages as to test the quesof in dispute, and the amount of damage one way or the other have no effect OD that question I do not, ho wever, by this remark, intend to limit your discretion in this matter. TheJury retired to their room, but sent in three times for further instructions before they finally returned sverdiet. They wished to know, 1. Whether they must decide according to the law ? 2. Whether, if the passengers requested that Dr. P. be put out, it was menable for the conductor to put him out and 3. What was reasonable regulation. The answers to these questions are anticipated in the charge which is given in full above. After an absence of a couple of hours, the Jury brought in a verdict for the defendants. SPREME COURT-SPECIAL TERM-DEC 19-Before Judge CLERKE. MOTION TO DISCHARGE ON BAIL. motion Was made to discharge Frances Leon (alias Wice Dupres) on bail. Two indictments are pending against for feloniously stealing pieces of silk; first from Stewart, in February, 1856, and second, from Lewis B. Loder & Co. It is alleged on her behalf. that she is quite ill. The motion was argued by Jomes T. Brady for the applicant, udAssistant District Attorney Sedgwick for the people. Judge Clerke denied the application, on the ground that to antit would be to interfere with the province of the Court of The Mechanics' Bank agt. the Enterprise Insurance Co. Default to be opened. Receiver to have ten days to swer. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS-SPECIAL TERM-DEC. 19Before Judge DALY. John W. Consall agt. he Mayor, &c. Motion for leave to amend the complaint granted. G. B. Greenleaf agt. Robert Jarvis. Judgment for plaintiff on demurrer, with liberty to defendant to amend on payment of costs, &c. Charles Bouton, &c. agt. Augustus Summert. Order appointing a receiver of the property, effects