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THE SAVINGS-BANKS OF SAN FRANCISCO. Savings-banks are usually mmong the first to suffer from panies. Their depositors are, as A class, crédulous, excitable, and illiterate. Every whisper tends to scare them. Then the deposits represent n vast amount of pinching economy, self-denial, and hard industry. The thought of losing their little bard-won accumulations is terrible. The individual depositor is, as A rule, far less able to bear the loss than is the average depositor in an ordinary bank. He in therefore more nervous and frightened by every imagined danger. Those causes combine to make a panio especially perilous to n savings-bank, despite the protection afforded by requiring depositors to give thirty or sixty days' notice. This fact makes the position of the San Francisco savings-banks, during the temporary flurry caused by the sudden crash of the Bank of California, especially noteworthy. Their deposits were immensely Inrge. Their depositors were more than 50,000 in number. Yet they scareely felt the panie nt all. The Hibornia Bank has 17,930 depositors, chiefly Irish, only 152 of whom wished to withdraw their money. The Gernian Bank, with 9,373 depositors, received applications from less than 100. The French Bank was troubled by only forty-seven out of 6,000 depositors. The corresponding figures for the other kindred institutions are no follows: Clay Street Bank, deposited in by Americans, only 200 out of 10,854; Odd-Fellows' Bank, mostly Americans, only 150 out of 8,072; Savings Union, mostly Americans, only 67 out of 6,518 depositors. About this same proportion of the timid to the confident holds true in relation to the smaller banks. Altogethor, out of 56,377 depositors, only 718 fell victims to the panic and rushed for their money. This is less than 1} per cent. The panic-stricken are to be punished for their fright by being denied permission to open their accounts again. About four years ngo, the Hibernin Bank had a run upon it. When the excitement subsided and the timid ones returned with their savings, the managers peremptorily refused to receive thom. Opinions will differ as to the wisdom of this vindictivo course, but its imitation by all the banks now shows that 'Frisco considers it to have been a stroke of policy. There is n striking contrast between the California savings-banks, during the so-called gold-panic of 1875, and those east of the Mississippi during the greenback-panic of 1873. In the one case, only three out of every 200 depositors try to get their money out of the banks. There is nothing worthy to be called a "run." The bank-doors stand open. Business is transacted regularly and without interruption. No workingman loses a cent of his hard-earned savings. Matters wore a far different aspect in 1873, with 'our savings-banks. The great mass of the depositors of greenbacks rushed to the banks. Many of the Intter closed their doors, and, in some cases, the doors have stayed shut ever sinco. Millions of savings were lost, and thousands of poor families were made far poorer by being stripped of the pennies and dollars, the representative of long and painful toil, standing to their credit on the books. Look on this picture, and then on that, and decide by sight whether n gold basis is an unsafe one in case of a credit panic.
