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signally defeated. Though sadly crippled since the fire, it was hoped by the management that the Institution would worry through, but the series of sudden failures in St. Louis brought a run upon the quivering bank, which, in an effort to save itself, paid out from $300,000 to $400,000 of its cash means without securing the object sought-the allayingof the excitement. It was finally forced to fall back upon the sixty-day rule, though it has constantly paid out money to needy depositors. This drain, the payment of the half-yearly interest of 3 per cent on $4,000,000 of de posits, and the slow receipts of deposits, conspired to still further weaken the Institution, which, up to July 1, had paid $800,000 over its receipts, and thus parted with the bulk of itecash means. Its assets were of an unfortunate nature. Masses of real estate, which could not be turned owing to the general depression of the market, crippled paper secured by lots whose buildings had been destroyed by the fire, and an enormous amount of unimproved property, taken for debt, and valuable only as it represented a dead loss in the taxes that must be paid, made up the list. The $500,000 capital had been wiped away and the interest of the stockholders extinguished by the hard times that had eaten sadly into the prosperity of the bank, and shrunk it from a live and healthy institution to a pitiful monument of the banking system. It is estimated that nearly one-third of its loans were to mechanics and the salaried class, who borrowed to build homes, and whom the Institution endeavored by every means to assist when the hour of payment found them unable to respond. All this time it preserved its high rate of interest on deposits, notwithstanding the fact that much of its money was idle and its expenses heavy. Perhaps this outline of its affairs will remove any doubt that may exist as to the propriety of the explosion. It is certain that Mr. Spencer did not fully enjoy the confidence of the financial community. His unfortunate experience in the Cook County National, which subsequently landed high and dry, militated against him seriously, and through him against the State Savings. But he managed to stem even this tide until the troubles in St. Louis precipitated the disaster he had hoped to avert. But little could be learned of the condition of the bank for some time before the failure, and this fact, connected with surmises that Mr. Spencer had reasons for suppressing all information, did not tend to the establishment of the confidence he coveted. When the necessity for raising money became absolute, Mr. Spencer went among bankers and said he had $1,000,000 in paper good for its face, $1,000,000 in slow paper, and $1,000,000 in miscellaneous securities. Per contra, his obligations were $3,000,000, and on this showing he wanted $300,000 on such securities as he could afford to part with, claiming that this would enable him to raise from $300,000 to $500,000 in New York, with which he could restore credit. It was readily seen that he would have no first-class securities left, and that the bank must go under by the 1st of January, and bankers concluded that there would be less disappointment if it should fall now than in the winter, when less could be realized on the securities than when the corn was waving, the crops moving, and business generally more brisk. As to the dividends for depositors, Mr. Spencer has claimed that they will reach 75 or 80 per cent., or, under first-class management, 90 per cent., if the paper were sold wisely and slowly, while bad management will reduce them to 60 or 70 per cent. How much really will be realized depends upon the manner in which the vast mass of real estate can be utilized. The question whether the affairs of the bank have been managed dishonestly, or merely imprudently, is asked, and an investigation is awaited anxiously. Mr. Spencer has always been secretive, and has kept the details of his administration to himself. In how far this has been a wise course is left for time to determine. The depositors feel desirous of understanding the matter, even if they receive no other equivalent for their money. From these facts it is manifest that the State Savings Institution was doomed. No general pressure exists upon banking interests, and none was needed to cripple the foundation of this one institution. Flush times might have saved it, but flush times were necessary, and a little pinching. which has not yet affected, and will not affect, the rest, has raised the tombstone of the bank whose vitality has been sadly impaired since the fire.-Chicago Tribune, Aug. 29.