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debts, dues, and demands due the state.
Under this act many bonds were put out with
coupons, which expressed on their face that
they were receivable for taxes.
On the seventh of March, 1872, however,
the general assembly passed another act pro-
hibiting the officers charged by law with the
collection of taxes from receiving in payment
thereof anything else than coin, or treasury,
or national bank notes. The supreme court
of appeals of Virginia decided at its Novem-
ber term, 1872, in the case of Antoni against
Wright, that in issuing these bonds the state
entered into a valid contract with all persons
taking the coupons to receive them in pay-
ment of taxes and state dues; that the act of
1872, so far as it conflicted with this contract,
was void; and that the writ of mandamus
was the proper remedy to compel a collector
to accept the coupons in question when offered
in payment of taxes.
On the fourteenth of January, 1882, the
general assembly passed another act, entitled
"An act to prevent frauds upon the common-
wealth and the holders of her securities in
the collection and disbursement of revenues,"
which provided, among other things, that
coupons should not be received for taxes until
their genuineness had been established by an
appropriate judical proceeding, the nature of
which the act duly set forth.
On the twentieth of March Andrew Antoni
tendered to the treasurer of the city of Rich-
mond a coupon for $415 in payment of taxes.
It was refused and Antoni potitioned the su-
preme court of appeals for a mandamus to re-
quire its acceptance. That court being equally
divided in opinion on the questions involved,
denied the writ and the case was brought to
this court for review Chief Justice Waite in
delivering the opinion of the court says the
question we are now to consider is
not whether if the coupon tendered is
in fact genuine, and such as ought un-
der the contract to be received and
the tender is kept good, the treasurer can
proceed to collect the tax by distraint or such
other process as the law allows, without mak-
ing himself personally responsible for any
trespass he may commit, but whether the act
of 1882 violates any implied obligation of the
state in respect to the remedies that may be
employed for the enforcement of its contract
if the collector refuses to take them.
The right of the coupon holder is to have his
coupon received for taxes when offered. The
question here is not as 'to that right, but as to
the remedy the holder has for its enforcement
when denied. At the time the coupon was
issued there was a remedy by mandamus from
the supreme court of appeals to compel the tax
collector to take the coupon and cancel the
tax. By the act of 1882 the following changes
are made in the old remedy: First, the
taxes actually due must be paid in money
before the court can proceed after the
collector has signified in the proper way
his willingness to receive the coupons if they
are genuine and in law receivable; second,
the coupons must be filed in the court of ap-
peals; and third, they must be sent to the local
court to have the fact of their genineness and
receivability determined, subject to an ap-
peal to the circuit court and the supreme
court of appeals. As the suit is for a
mandamus all the provisions of the
general law regulating the practice not
inconsistent with the new law remain, and
if the petitioner succeeds in getting his
peremptory writ he will recover his costs. No
issues are required that it would not have
been in the power of the collector to raise be-
fore the change was made, and there is no ad-
ditional burden of proof imposed to meet the
issues, so that the simple question is whether
the requirements of the advance of the taxes
and the change of the place and manner of
trial impair the obligation of the contract on
the part of the state to furnish an adequate
and efficacious remedy to compel a tax col-
lector to receive the coupons in payment of
taxes in case he will not do it without com-
pulsion. In the opinion of this court they do
not.
Inasmuch as we are satisfied that a remedy
is given by the act of 1882, substantially
equivalent to that in force when the coupons
were issued, we have not deemed it necessary
to consider what would be the effect of a
statute taking away all remedies. The judg-
ment of the Virginia supreme court of appeals
is affirmed. Justices Field and Harlau dis-
sented.
### MR. JUSTICE FIELD DISSENTS.
Justice Field in his dissent says: "I am
not able to agree with the majority of the
court in the judgment in this case, nor in
the reasoning on which it is founded.
The legislation of Virginia which is
sustained appears to me to be in flagrant vio-
lation of the contract with her creditors under
the act of Mar. 30, 1871, commonly known as
the funding act; and the doctrines advanced
by the court, though not so intended, do, in
fact, license any disregard of her obligations
which the ill-advised policy of the legislature
may suggest. I find myself bewildered by
the opinion of the majority of the court. I
confess that I cannot comprehend it, so for-
eign does it appear to be to what I have here-
tofore supposed to be established and settled
law, and I fear that it will be appealed
to as an excuse, if not justification,
for legislation amounting practically to the
repudiation of the obligations of states and
of their subordinate minicipalities-their
cities and counties. It will only be necessary
to insert in their statutes a false recital of the
existence of forged and spurious bonds and
coupons as a plausible protext for such legis-
lation-and their schemes of plunder will be
accomplished. No greater calamity could, in
my judgment, befall the country than the
general adoption of the doctrine that it is not
a constitutional impairment of the obligation
of contracts to embarrass their enforcement
with onerous and destructive conditions and
thus to evade the performance of them. I am
of opinion that the judgment of the court of
appeals of Virginia should be reversed and
the cause remanded with instructions to
award the mandamus.
### THE OTHER CASES DECIDED
are as follows: No. 166, Orsor Adams, substi-
tuted for George E. Bowden, as receiver of
the First National bank of Norfolk, Va., ap-
pellant vs. Jacob C. Johnston and Betsy Val-
entine. Appeal from circuit court of the
United States for the district of New Jersey.
Decree reversed with costs and cause re-
manded with directions to enter decree in
conformity with the opinion of this court.
Opinion of Mr. Justice Blatchford. No. 22,
John N. Cushing et al. appellants vs. John
Laird, the younger, et al. Appeal from the cir-
cuit court of the United States for the southern
district of New Yoak. Decree affirmed, with
costs and interest. Opinion by Mr. Justice
Gray.
No. 113. J. P. Giraud Foster and James
Thomson, garnishees, appellants, vs. John N.
Cushing, et al. Appeal from the circuit court
of the United States for the southern district
of New York. Decree affirmed, with costs..
Opinion by Mr. Justice Gray.
No. 51. James D. Russell et al., appellants,
vs. Anne R. Allen et al. Appeal from the
circuit court of the United States for the
eastern district of Missouri. Decree af-
firmed, with costs. Opinion by Mr. Justice
Gray.
No. 82. Wallace S. Jones, executor, &c., et
al., appellants, vs. Wm. N. Habersliam and
Wm. Hunter, executors, &c. Appeal from