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Drainage company against the Bor- ough of Olyphant, and Gunster, as- signee, against Jessup and others, com- monly known as the City bank case. In the first named opinion, which is by Justice McCollum, a nice compli- ment is paid the trial judge, Hon. R. W. Archbald, on his review of the long- drawn-out case, contained in an opin- ion on the rule for a new trial. The Supreme court's confirmation of Judge Archbald's finding is couched in these words: This was an action of ejectment brought to recover possession of land which the plaintiff claimed he had valid title to. That the land was conveyed to him many years ago was shown by the deeds and papers in his possession and admitted in evidence on the trial. It required no oral testimony to establish his case in chief. The documentary evidence alone was quite suffi- cent for that purpose. The reply of the defend- ant to the claim of the plaintiff was based on an alleged equity arising from an alleged parol trust. It needs no argument to prove that a defense of this nature cannot prevail in the ab- sence of clear and satisfactory proof to sustain it. "The legal title to lands ought not to be exposed to the peril of a successful attack, ex- cepting where the right in equity is clearly established," Clark J. in Earnest's Appeal, 106 Pa. 318. # A NICE COMPLIMENT. The testimony introduced on the trial was re- markably voluminous and a part of it related to matters relevant to the issue and occurring more than fifty years ago. This testimony we have examined and considered with care and the con- clusion we have drawn from it is that it pre- sented an issue for the determination of a jury under proper instructions from the court. A specification herein of any part of the testimony is needless. Every part of it which is material to a proper understanding of the issue was re- ferred to in the charge, which occupies eighty pages of the appellant's paper book. More ex- haustive and pains-taking instructions seldom if ever appear in a charge. Whether there was an error in the instructions is a question to be con- sidered in connection with the assignments re- lating to the subject. There are thirty-seven assignments filed in the case and ten of them are based on excerpts from the charge. We have carefully examined and fully considered the excerpts on which the ten assignments above referred to rest, and are un- able to discover in either of them any cause for a reversal of the judgment or re-trial of the case. In this connection we may state that, in our opinion, the learned court below did not err in declining to grant permission to the defend- ants' counsel to open and close the case to the jury. This refusal is the basis of the second assignments, which we now dismiss with the as- signments based on the excerpts from the charge. The assignments relating to the affirm- ance or denial of the points submitted and to the admission or rejection of offers of evidence need not be specifically referred to nerein. Hav- ing examined all the assignments and duly con- sidered the arguments of counsel in support of and against them, we conclude that there is no reasonable ground for reversing the judgment entered in the court below. The case was care- fully and fairly tried and the result reached is in conformity with the testimony on which the verdict was based. All the assignments are therefore dismissed. Judgment affirmed. # PROCEEDINGS IRREGULAR. The opinion in the Olyphant sewer case is by Justice Fell. There was only one question at issue, the validity of the plaintiff's charter, and Justice Fell disposes of it in modest space, as fol- lows: Tested by the settled rule of our cases the con- clusion reached by the learned judge of the com- mon pleas is right for the reasons stated by him. We have uniformly held that the validity of a charter for a public purpose cannot be de- etermined in a collateral proceeding by a pri- vate suitor. It can be done only in a direct pro- ceeding to which the commonwealth is a party. Among the more recent cases on the subject are Hinchman vs. Philadelphia and West Chester Turnpike Road company, 160 Pa. 150, and the Gas and Water company vs. Borough of Down- ington, 183 Pa. 255. Whether a right or fran- chise claimed by a corporation is conferred by its charter may be inquired into in a proceeding at law or in equity by a party injured, as pro- vided by the act of June 19th, 1871, P. L. 1331; but whether for any reason the charter of a cor- poration was originally invalid or has been for- feited is a question which the commonwealth only can raise. The decree is affirmed at the cost of the ap- pellants. Judge Edwards tried the Olyphant case, and as has been the invariable rule with his findings in municipal law, the Supreme justices concur with him in every one of his conclusions. The City bank case was tried by Judge Archbald. The witness referred to is Edward Merrifield. His transfer of his interest in the bank was made just a few days before the second trial was decided by Judge Archbald to be a colorable transaction and therefore could not be allowed to make the wit- ness competent. As the whole case de- pended on Mr. Merrifield's testimony, the trial was abruptly terminated and an appeal taken to the Supreme court. The Supreme court, through Justice Fell, had this to say of the matter: # ACTION WAS COLORABLE. This action was brought by the assignee for the benefit of creditors of the Scranton City bank on a bond conditioned for the faithful per- formance of the duties of its vice-president. The principal and two of the sureties died before the trial, and the representatives of their estates have been substituted on the record as defend- ants. The witness whose competency was chal- lenged as to matters which had occurred during the lives of the deceased parties was a stock- holder in the bank at the time the assignment was made, and as such was liable to the credi- tors in double the amount of the stock held by him. He was also a director, and with the other directors had entered into an agreement with the depositors to pay them in full and to take an assignment of their claims against the bank, and claims amounting to $183,000 had been as- signed to them. For the purpose of carrying out this agreement, the witness had joined with the other directors in borrowing a large amount of money on their joint notes, one which for $9,000 was still unpaid. Notwithstanding the apparent incompetency of the witness because of his in- terest in the result of the trial, it was contend- ed that he was qualified to testify because the statute of limitation was a bar to any proceed- ings to enforce the liability of the stockholders, under the special provisions of the bank's char- ter, and because he had assigned his interest in the fund in the hands of the assignee for the benefits of creditors which he had acquired by the agreement mentioned for the purchase of the depositors' claims against the bank. It was held that the statute of limitations relieved the wit- ness from liability as a stockholder, and that the assignment of his interest was not colorable, but that it did not carry the whole interest, as he will still be liable on his agreement to pay the stockholders in full, and on the note given for the money borrowed for the purchase of claims. In view of the recent decision in Darragh vs. Stevenson, 183 Pa. 397, which was not brought
