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In the trade the liabilities of the firm are reported as high as $500,000, but no definite information is accessible. The firm generally carried an insurance $ $600,000. It is composed of Christopher Nugent and James Nugent. They succeeded Nugent, Kelly Co. in January, 1872, Mr. C. Nugent purchasing and the interests of James Kelly, Thomas Hughes B. Moran. THE NEWS IN WALL STREET. The news of the bank's suspension was received in WallStreet early in the day, and it spread with marvellous rapidity. But the truth was so stupendous that even the most credulous doubted the accuracy of the reports in regard to the amount of the embezzlement. and it was not long before it was asserted and currently believed that the sum was $200,000 instead of $2,000,000. A few of the more cautious a bank officers said that it must be bad failure and that the amount must exceed the smaller sum, but they based their opinlons only on the supposed condition of the bank and the known wealth of its directors. It was not until late in the afternoon that it began to be generally believed that the first reports had been correct. The astonishment was great and the ntmost anxiety was manifested to know what had become of the funds of the institution, and how the deficit had been concealed from its own directors and from the Bank Examiner. The event was admitted to be the most startling that had occurred in many years. especially because the magnitude of the deficit was likely to shake public confidence in other banking institutions. Rumors were quickly in circulation in the street that the Mechanics' National Bank and the Chemical National Bank, of this city, were large losers by the failure. So great at one time was the uncertainty in Wall Street that the suggestion that it was the Mechanics' National Bank of this city that had failed passed unchallenged. The names of one or two Stock Exchange firms were mentioned also as large losers, and the results of the suspensien, it was feared, would be wide and disas rous. Later reports, which did not fail to confirm the amount of the deficit, served to allay apprehension. It was found that generally the losses would fall on persons able to sustain them, and that the New-York banks and firms would not be hurt by their losses. The greatest injury that would result to New-York would be, it was admitted, the shock to financial confidence and business credit. That a national bank could be carried on after its capital, surplus and a large part of its deposits had been absorbed, and that large business house that had enjoyed good credit, and, according to commercial opinion, had been making money for several years. was absolutely bankrupt, were facts that tended to shake the confidence of the business world. The stock market felt the force of the blow, and, sensitive to all rumors, it was feverish and drooping all day. THE NEWARK BANK'S CORRESPONDENT HERE. The Mechanics' National Bank of this city, of which Benjamin B. Sherman is president, has been the New-York correspondent of the Newark bank for more than forty years. At times the Newark bank has had large sums to its credit in the NewYork bank, and, at other times, it has borrowed of it large sums, for which it gave collateral security. No question of the solvency of the New-Jersey bank or the honesty of its cashier ever rose to mar business relations of the banks. Some of the methods of the Newark bank were not fully approved. but they were explained by the peculiar position of the institution in having the accounts of large insurance and mercantile companies. The eashier of the bank, Mr. Baldwin, occasionally X. plained the necessity of borrow ing large sums from the New-York correspondent on this ground. He represented that the heavy customers of the bank had been forced to make large payments in the course of their business, and had reduced, therefore, their deposits. All these explanations, which agreed with the known facts, were plansibly made and accepted unhesitatingly. No little of the confidence felt in the bank was owing to the high character and acknowledged wealth of directors. Shortly after the last statement of the Newark bank was published. a peculiarity in it attracted the attention of the officers of the Mechanics' National Bank of this city. It had been observed at once officers of other banks at Newark who wondered at the statement, but could not prove it false. This peculiar feature was the large amount due from reserve agents, nearly $1,500,000. The officers of the correspondent bank in NewYork, to which the Newark bank was then indebted about $300,000, sought an explanation of this item from its cashier. Mr. Baldwin's explanation was that the money belonged to the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, of Newark: that the bank was paying a small rate of interest on it, and was loaning it to two New-York banksat a considerably higher rate. The transaction, according to Mr. Baldwin, was productive of a handsome profit to his corporation, which therefore was interested in not disturbing the loans. There was nothing in this to arouse suspicion: but when the cashier, in reply to the natural question, asked to be excused from naming the New-York banks to which he had lent the money, the officers of the New-York bank became somewhat alarmed, and determined to ascertain the correctness of Mr. Baldwin's statements. They were not quick enough, however, and the failure of the Newark bank came before they had les ned that the representations of its cashier were false. CULMINATION OF THE CASHIER'S DIFFICULTIES. Mr. Baldwin's difficulties eulminated on Saturday. In preparing for an examination of his bank he made a last effort to deceive the National Bank Examiner. He called at the Mechanics' National Bank in this city, which held $444,000 in paper collateral security for a loan of over $300,000. The absence of so large an amount of its bills receivable would be fatal to his passing the examination, especially when he was forced to represent a still larger sum as being due from its New-York correspondent. Stepping into the New-York bank he suggested that he would like to exchange the collateral securities which that bank held. He wished, he remarked. to make some comparisons of the paper with his books. was informed that none of the notes would mature for at least thirty days. and some of them not for two or three months. He was reminded also of his bank must show plainly a the notes of which he had a is understood to have Mr. record that Baldwin the of books been have full still urged list. anxious it But to make the exchange, and to on