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from the Iowa wife does not appear to have been known. After his death in 1895, Mrs. Rash No. 1, or Mrs. Hadley, started for Montana as soon as she heard of his death in order to prove her claim to the estate. She resorted to the courts to endeavor to establish her claim. In passing upon the case, Judge Woody held that Berthena Rash was the lawful widow of Daniel Rash, and that the presumption which the law raises in a case like this, namely, that Rash must have been divorced at some time, must stand until the plaintiff had proved that no such divorce had occurred. This is contended by Elizabeth Hadley. who appealed from Judge Woody's decision. to be erroneous, and she asked for a reversa! of the case. Chief Justice Pemberton, for the court, affirmed the lower court, holding that the authorities almost universally hold that the presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known to the law. "The law presumes morality, and not immorality, marriage and not concubinage, legitimacy and not bastardy," say the supreme court of Indiana in a case similar to this one. One other opinion was also rendered by the court to-day.. This was an appeal from the district court of Lewis and Clarke county, involving the possession of 5,365 shares of the Helena & Frisco mining stock, and was the outgrowth of the suspension of the First National bank of this city. Last August Receiver Wilson of the bank obtained a writ of attachment for the bank stock and other property in the endeavor to collect several notes owed the bank by Harvey Barbour of this city, aggregating nearly $100,000. The sheriff levied upon the stock and Barbour moved to have the whole writ discharged on the ground that the two last items in the complaint, amounting to about $3,000, were irregularly inserted, because the affidavit in support of the writ in this respect was insufficient in that it did not allege that the notes had not been secured, or if secured, the security had become valueless. Judge Smith, in the district court, found that the writ must stand as to the first three items, and that the whole writ could not be discharged on account of the failure to make a proper affidavit as to the last two counts. From this ruling Barbour appealed. Justice Piggot, for the court, affirmed the lower court, holding that the motion to discharge the writ in toto was too broad, and that Barbour's remedy should have been a motion to discharge, modify or amend the writ as to the two demands irregularly inserted in it.